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Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche 
Jon Moline., University of Wisconsinr October 14, 1976
What were the parts of the psyche posited by Plato in thé Republic? The question 
calls not for a list but for an account of the grounds on which Plato posited and distin­
guished such parts. It calls for an account of their nature and role in his system.
We are not lacking in attempts at such an account. These parts have been termed 
"faculties", "principles", "activities", "aspects", "instances", and "levels" of the 
psyche. Their nature and role have been characterized in ways influenced as much perhaps 
by the connotations of these terms as by the details of Plato's text. Yet scholars have 
long known better. Ritter, Taylor and Graeser, to name only three, have plainly warned of 
the confusions that result from characterizing the parts Plato posits as if they were psy­
chological divisions more familiar to us.
Unhappily, to warn of possible confusions is not sufficient to deliver us from them, 
for they continue to be encouraged by familiar works of interpretation. Perhaps the most 
common of these confusions results from the suggestion that the parts of the psyche posited 
by Plato were facilities ~  "powers" or "capacities" on the order of those posited by Aristotle 
and modern psychologists. It will be helpful in dispelling this and other such confusions 
to ask the question, "What were the parts of the psyche posited by Plato?", and to minimize 
the seductive influence of any later psychological terminology in answering it. The answer 
can then be applied to illuminate related themes in later dialogues, especially the Phaedrus.
I
Any plausible answer to the question must be bound up with Plato's theory of justice.
At 386D-E and again at 435A-B Plato lays down the hypothesis that justice in the^polis and 
justice in the individual are the same. This hypothesis dominates the dialogue. By 435A-B 
Plato has argued at length that justice in the polis is a harmony of |pecialized function 
obtaining among distinct and potentially seditious classes of agents.
The question Plato must explore from 435B on is whether or not the psyche, like the 
polis, actually contains distinct and usually seditious agents. The stakes riding on the 
answer are by this point high. Justice in the polis he makes out to be a certain relation 
among plausibly real and distinct relata. If the psyche does not contain equally real and 
distinct relata/ justice there cannot be the same as justice in the polis, and Plato has 
wasted 3 1/2 books. In effect he recognizes these stakes at 434D6-7.
What Plato needs in order to show that he has not been exploring a blind alley must 
not be minimized. Nothing less than a structural and functional isomorphism between polis 
and psyche will do. It would be an understatement t^en to say that on Plato's view there 
must be an analogy between the polis and the psyche. The appearance of being one thing 
must prove as deceptive for the psyche as it did for the ordinary polis at 422E-423A. The 
psyche must upon examination prove to be literally complex, and literally reducible to parts 
which are independent of one another in the sense that they can stand in direct conflict 
as political factions do.
In his examination and argument Plato employs both formal and observational premises.
At 430E-431A he comments upon the phenomenon we call self-control:
... the expression "self-control" is laughable, for the controller of self and the 
self that is weaker and is controlled is the same person ... But ... the expression 
seems to want to indicate that in the psyche of the person himself there is a better 
and a worse part; whenever what is by nature the better part is in control of the 
worse, this is expressed by saying that the person is self-controlled or master of 
himself, and this is a term of praise. When, on the other hand, the smaller and 




and worse, this is made a reproach and is called^being defeated by oneself, and a 
person in that situation is called uncontrolled.
^he view of self-control suggested here is one Plato continues to hold as late as the 
Laws. As stated here in the Republic it prepares the way for Plato's formal argument for 
regarding the psyche as literally complex and isomorphic to the polis. That argument pro­
ceeds in several steps which we may paraphrase as follows:
1) . It is plain that the same thing will not do or suffer opposites in relation to
the same thing in the same respect and at the same time (435B6-8) . Such opposites 
would be, e.g., assenting and dissenting, aiming at something and rejecting it, 
embracing and avoiding (437B1-3).
2) . So if perhaps one finds such opposites arising in oneself, one will not be "the
same thing" but a plurality (436B8-C1).
3) . One does find such opposites arising in oneself, since
V ·> / ^  y
a) . Anger (Ή)ν opyj'jv") sometimes combats appetites Λ e f t t -
Ou^Cous) as one alien thing does another (440A6-7) .
b) . Often we observe that when appetites compel a person contrary to the
'calculativa' part (*Tov* Xo^ lct^ o v), he rebukes himself (440A9-B1) .
c) . The 'spirited' part (Ίνο O vfic&t&es ) ± s by nature the ally of thj^
'calculativa' unless it is perverted by poor nurture (441A2-4).
/Λ ν'
There is evidence then of "civil war in the psyche" ('Ttjs S β 'Τ & β 'ίϊ
440E5), a conflict requiring distinct and alien contestants. Evidence of 
such conflict may be observed not merely in oneself but in others. Thus, 
in Leontius' psyche there occurred a conflict between a part interested in 
viewinj^a pile of corpses and a part opposed to this as disgraceful (439E- 
440A) . This conflict was evinced in his behavior.
4) . It follows then that the psyche is indeed complex and faction-ridden in precisely
the way the polis had proved to be earlier (441C5-7). In its parts the psyche 
is isomorphic to the polis, for "the same kind of parts and the same number of 
parts are to be found in the polis and in the psyche of each of us" (441C6-7).
5) . The psyche and polis are isomorphic in their states or conditions, and in the
origin of these: "It necessarily follows that the individual is wise in the same
way, and in the same part of himself, as the city. ... And the part which makes 
the individual brave is the same as that which makes the city brave, and in the
same manner, and everything which makes for virtue is the same in b o t h ........ a
man is just in the same way as a city is just. ...the cj£y was just because each 
of the three classes in it was fulfilling its own task."
Two parallel pieces of reduction take place in Bk. IV. First Plato reduces a polis 
to its parts and the characteristics of a pölis to the characteristics and relations of 
its parts. At 435E Socrates says.
It would be laughable if anyone thought that the appearance of spiritedness in a 
polis is not derived from J^e individuals in it, as with those in Thrace or Scythia 
or generally in the North.
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At 428E it is claimed that if a polis seems wise as a whole/ this is owing to the 
or understanding found in its smallest part, the class of guardians. It is that class which 
is influential when the polis is said to display wisdom. And this influence is clearly lit­
erals the guardians cause certain wise things to be done and prevent the doing of unwise 
ones. Hence Plato is not merely trafficking in points of informal logic. The division into 
parts is likewise literal. The appearance that the polis as a whole is wise is deceptive, 
for it contains parts which lack wisdom, and if such parts had usurped the place of the 
wise part and had directed the behavior of the whole, the polis would have lacked wisdom.
Secondly, at 435E Socrates affijip that this same pattern of reductive argument is to 
be applied to the individual person. Again, this neither is nor could be a loose analogy 
if Plato's arguments are to go through. It is to be taken as a piece of sober theorizing, 
and taken as literally as any piece of theorizing in the dialogues. There are many indica­
tions of this. For example, at 443C-D, with none of the hints or warnings with which Plato 
usually surrounds self-consciously figurative langage, an overt act of a person is described 
as "the overt action of the thing that is in one". At 436A Plato had laid it down as one 
of two hypotheses (the one later accepted) that the parts of the psyche are the entities 
responsible when we start or move. Again at 439C-D overt conduct is said to mirror . 
or be an image of inner activity. And in applying this theory later in the Republic to 
assess the happiness or misery of the tyrant and the causes of the tyrant's actions, Socrates 
is made to remark that the tyrant's external acts betray the miserable internal economy of 
the tyrant's psyche to the informed observer who is able to consider the entire psyche.
The person who is a tyrant is so because he contains a tyrant, jgd it rules harshly over 
other, quite unwilling subjects even within the tyrant himself. Plato suggests at 577A-B 
that he has grounded this view on the observation of tyrants in their unguarded moments, 
presumably those in which the miserable state of their oppressed parts and the fearful 
state of the oppressing ones are evident.
There is no blinking the fact that Plato was attempting to account causally for per­
sons' actions, not analyze concepts. One does not appeal to observations of tyrants in 
their unguarded moments to substantiate a piece of conceptual analysis. Plato is out to 
account causally not just for isolated actions but for the overall direction (or lack of 
it) in the life a person leads. This is evident at 581B-C, where Socrates is made to claim 
that there are three sorts of people and three corresponding sorts of lives. An individual 
is of one of these three sorts and leads the life he or she does because of the part of the 
psyche which rules the others in that individual's psyche. Talk of "rule" is plainly causal 
and explanatory in force, and given the isomorphism of polis and psyche that Plato posjt^ s 
and requires for his argument, we are to take it as straightforward, not metaphorical.
Talk of the rule of one part over others and of the difficulty the best part has in 
achieving it in the face of efforts by the other parts to usurp its role underscores Plato's 
very ground for believing there are parts. The sole ground on which Plajg distinguishes 
parts of the psyche is the psyche's susceptibility to internal conflict. Susceptibility 
to internal conflict on this view shows that the psyche cannot be one entity. The "cannot" 
here is logical: if x is both G and H, and anything which is H is not G, then it would fol­
low ¡that X is both G and not G, which cannot be the case. If x nevertheless seems to be 
both G and not G, we must look for seams in x; x cannot conceivably be simple. Thus if 
Leontius both wants to view corpses and despises corpse-viewing, and if x's despising corpse­
viewing entails x's not wanting to view corpses, "Leontius" is the name of at least two 
entities deceptively packaged as one.
11
We have noted that Plato divided human beings into classes in accordance with their 
predominant desires or ultimate aims. He argues at 485D-E and 486C that the desire that
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predominates in a person's life will correlate with that person's chief area of expertise 
or ability. One is the kind of person one is owing to one's predominant desire. One may 
have others, however. Farmers, as we see at 374A-P, are able to form something they might 
call an army to defend the polis, and may even want to do this, but they are likely to do 
a poor job of it, and had best cater to appetite by growing food and leave defense to strong- 
spirited, fearless professional soldiers (375A9-B3). Function varies not precisely with 
capacity in any minimal sense of "capacity" but with competence. At 353A Plato indicates 
that a thing's function is shown by what it alone can do or by what it can do better than 
anything else. In his political thought, it is the second indication of function which is 
relevant. The auxiliaries have the protective function they do not because craftsmen can­
not wield weapons but because the auxiliaries can perform this function better than anyone 
else. There would be no occasion for Plato's principle of specialization if citizens of 
diverse classes could not overlap at a minimal level in their capacities and their desires. 
The occasion for this principle is the widespread in the Quinary polis.
Plato sees clearly the distinction between minimal capacity and competence.
Since Plato regards the psyche as isomorphic to a polis composed of people capable of 
, it would be odd if he chose an entirely different principle of specializa­
tion for the parts of the psyche than the very principle he had invoked for the parts of 
the polis —  the^çrinciple that one is to do what one is competent to do and leave other 
tasks to others. Yet this odd shift in principles of specialization has been attributed 
to Plato by interpreters who characterize the parts of the psyche he posits as fag^lties.
A faculty, by definition, is a capacity for the one thing its name would suggest.
"Appetite" on a facultist view would be a capacity for a certain sort of desire and nothing 
else; "Reason" would be simply and solely a capacity for reasoning. Thus a faculty's 'spe­
cialization of function* would be the automatic and trivial result of its incapacity to do 
anything its name did not suggest.
Such triviality is not uncommonly credited to Plato by interpreters and translators 
who speak of the parts of the psyche as if they were faculties. But this will not fit 
the text. Talk of one faculty's usurping the function of another would be plainly absurd.
Yet Plato at 440E5 speaks of 'Trjs <ΐτ<χ<π£ , a "civil war in the psyche", and at 443D3-6
describes the parts' meddlesome tendency to usurp the functions of other parts. Talk of 
usurpation or indeed any other activity of a faculty would be doubly absurd once we realize 
that faculties are capacities, and capacities are no^agents; they require agents to employ 
them, and usurpation is clearly the act of an agent. Yet this talk of usurpation is 
essential to Plato's view of injustice.
Another insuperable textual obstacle to taking the parts as faculties is found in 
Plato's description of what it takes to inhibit such usurpation of function. At 442A-B 
and 586E5 he prescribes education and training to induce each part to perform its own 
function. Plainly one does not have to induce what cannot by definition be otherwise.
Facultist mistakes stem from a failure to take seriously Plato's isomorphism of polis 
and psyche. At 441C6-7 he claims that there are the same number and kind of parts in the 
psyche as in the polis. The parts of the polis were classes of people grouped together 
not on the basis of their possessing one and only one capacity per group but on the basis 
of the common predominant love or interest and common competence found in the group's mem­
bers. With this isomorphism Plato commits himself to assigning parts of the psyche usur- 
pable functions and the minimal versatility this presupposes.
Further evidence that Plato acts on this commitment may be found in the diverse names 
he gives to each part. To weigh this evidence fairly, however, we must for the time
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being refrain from taking any of these names as exhausting or limiting the capabilities of 
the part to which it is assigned. Given their history in faculty psychology and in inter­
pretations influenced by it, the terms "Reason", "Spirit" and "Appetite" unfortunately do 
exhaust or limit the capacity of anything to which they are applied in our context. It 
will be prudent then to let the parts go incognito for a time, labelling them ^controver­
sially as A, B and C, and noting the things Plato says and suggests about the desires, 
capacities and activities of each in their names and descriptions.
One obstacle to doing this is the English^definite article which occurs in mechanical 
renderings of Platonic expressions such as t o  We are often told this means
"The Desiderative" or "The Appetitive". This is misleading, however, for the connotations 
of the English definite article differ substantially from those of Plato's neuter singular 
T o . Plato's To was a standard Greek device for making a noun or piece of technical termi­
nology out of anything to which it was prefixed. When so used it does not suggest "the one 
and only", and thus provides no support for interpreters who treat a part of the psyche
labelled t o as the one and only thing in the psyche capable on Plato's view of _____ .
These parts, we must remind ourselves, are isomorphic to usurpers and busybodies.
Even usurpers and busybodies have overriding or predominant loves, however, and lesser 
desires over which these normally hold sway. One can be a lover of more than one thing. /
We should bear this in mind when Plato describes each part of the psyche with multiple <4^°. - 
compounds. Part A, dominant in his philosopher-kings, is termed To  or "lover
of learning" and To c$Ckogo$ ov or "lover of wisdom" at 581B7. It is called Vo ΧογιGTikoyr 
or "calculative", as at 439D5, and is accordingly assigned the role of taking counsel :
(442B7) and exercising forethought on behalf of the entire psyche (441E5). Part B, domi­
nant in his auxiliaries, is called to u?l\ovikov' , "lover of victory" and TO cPt\oT<^w-,
"lover of honor" (581B1-2) . It is also called To θαμοβι£<5£ , "spirited", as at 441A3.
Part C, strongest in people suited to be craftsmen, is termed To 4?ι\ο*χ^ μ<*Ύον~, "lover of 
money" or "lover of possessions" (580E7) , and To , "lover of gain" (581A7) .
It is said to love food and drink (439D5-6), and is called Tr> or "appetitive"
(439D7).
What relation holds between the multiple "loves" attributed to each part? Plato evi­
dently did not conceive of these as miscellaneous and unrelated. At 357B4-D2 he had pointed 
out that people value some things for their own sakes, others for their consequences, and 
still others for both. The parts of the psyche resemble people of various political classes 
in this respect as in most others. At 580E6 he calls part C To or "lover
of money" in the very sentence in which he is explaining that it loves money because it is 
most conducive to its ultimate end (k ito T e \o u \rT c K i o i t... eTftSuMiou ) , the satisfaction of 
its appetites for food, drink and sex. Its regard for money is instrumental, much as its 
regard for securing part A's superior logistical ássistance is at 553C-D. It does not love 
thinking; it loves money and property as means to sensual gratification, and any regard it 
has for calculative ability is regard for this ability as a means to obtaining money and 
property. It is not indifferent to the instrumental value of thinking, and places some 
value on it, though it is not said to love it.
It seems reasonable to suppose that among the various loves assigned to part B at 
581A, the love of honor is primary, and victory, good reputation and rule are loved as 
means to this, though Plato is not explicit on this point.
If there is an ordering of means and ends in the various things loved by a given part, 
plainly there is nothing to prevent what is loved for its own sake by one part from being
r e ­
valued weakly as a means by another. At 441E5 part A is assigned the function of exercis­
ing forethought on behalf of the entire psyche. At 442C4-8 it is charged with understand­
ing and seeking what will benefit each part and the whole they comprise. To be concerned 
for each part is to be concerned to quiet and satisfy each, as we see from 571D5-572B2.
Thus, as 586D8 indicates, part A will actually prescribe or approve ) certain
pleasures of gain and victory. The parts need not disagree in their opinions about what
is of value and what is allowable. In a just person they will not disagree (442D), even 
though their natural tendency is to disagree.
A common awareness of means/end relationships in each part suggests precisely the 
sort of versatility a capacity for usurpation presupposes. It suggests a minimal capacity 
we might call 'cognitive* even in part C. Plato's distaste for demotic or popular senses 
of terms and for the ontological slum in which they have their use leads him to say that
part C is senseless (oLyc^ tco , 605B9) , but this must be taken in much the way one takes
his claim that none of the poleis Greeks lived in deserved to be called á polis (422E2- 
423B2) . Often he reminds us that on his view a term's primary denotation is an ideal 
paradigm and that things diverging widely from this scarcely deserve to have the term used 
of them. In the psyche the ideal ruler and administrator was part A, but we must not let 
his zeal in claiming its comparative superiority over parts B and C in this role obscure 
the fact that he has endowed B and C with sufficient ability to usurp the role for a time, 
if only to botch it. If part C were senseless in the way a rock is, there would be no ques­
tion of its usurping A 's role. C is senseless more nearly in the way Cleon the Tanner was, 
and foolish («Χογ^στον', 439D7) as he was also.
That Plato assigns a minimal level of 'cognitive' capacity to B and C is indicated in 
a number of ways other than their corresponding to political factions which have this 
capacity. At 571C, part C is said to be capable of devising elaborate dream plots while 
part A sleeps. Thus part C has the ability to imagine complex scenarios, and it is capa­
ble of 'ruling' not simply in sleep but in the waking life of tyrants, on his view.
The parts are frequently depicted as being aware of one another. The story of Leontius 
at 439E-440A suggests that part B combats and rebukes part C on occasion. Both parts are 
depicted as being capable of obeying or following part A, which suggests that they are aware 
of it and in communication with it (586D5-7, E3).
What the parts are aware of in one another are not merely desires but opinions. The 
unleashing of part C at 571C is not simply the unleashing of many and dread appetites 
(573D6-8) but the emancipation of certain opinions which were formerly freed only in sleep 
(574D-E). That parts B and C hold opinions and hence may be said to "think that..." is 
borne out at 603D where Plato speaks of us as having within ourselves contradictory opinions 
about the same thing at the same time. He is well aware of what this implies when taken 
together with his principle that the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same 
respect stand in opposite relations to a second thing. In fact he reiterates at 604B his
view that one may distinguish parts in cases of internal conflict.
This has surprising antecedents and implications. The practice of the elenctic Socratic 
dialectic in earlier dialogues and even in Bk. I of the Republic itself had made it glar­
ingly obvious that the same person at ttjg same time can unwittingly hold two or more opin­
ions which are in conflict on an issue. But now Plato can explain how and why Socrates
was able to find contradictory opinions in the same person. We each have inferior parts 
which tend to have inferior opinions. At 605C Plato speaks of a part which cannot distin­
guish the greater and lesser, but believes t r [ y o a ^ c o ) that the same things are now one.
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now the other. The opinions of a base part are also mentioned at 574D-Ë. Plato's stated 
goal is for all of the parts to agree in their opinions (442D3), for the person whose parts 
these are accordingly to be of one mind (603D).
Although the passage from 603-5 is more explicit than any in Bk. IV, it makes gg break 
with the views expressed in IV, and is in fact anticipated there in its essentials. When 
Plato at 437A stated his view that the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same 
respect be, do or suffer opposites, he made it quite inclusive enough for later application 
to thoughts and opinions. And in fact he immediately suggests such an application at 437B 
when he gives as his first example of a pair of opposites suggesting a division in the psyche 
/ro β'ΠίΝΓέίΑβίν', "nodding assent" or "approving", and 'to hvasreaew /', "nodding dissent" or 
"disapproving".
Part B is said to be not only capable of having opinions but to be in need of intelli­
gent communication either from the wisdom-loving part A within the person himself or perhaps 
from other persons' wisdom-loving parts. At 550B Plato speaks of bad communications in 
connection with the nurture of morally and politically inferior persons. As early as 410D 
he had claimed that To 6u^oet6es, which emerges as the "spirited" part B in Bk. IV, will 
become brave if rightly trained, but brutal, harsh and savage otherwise. He describes the 
training it needs as or "music". But "music" includes \ o y o i  or accounts, as 376E-
377A indicates. Plato holds that the honor-loving part B has need of stories, fables and 
the like to tame its wilder tendencies. And at 441A2-4 he claimed that it naturally heeds 
the instructions of the wisdom-loving part provided it has not been corrupted. If it heeds 
such instructions, stories and fables, then it must be able to understand them, much as the 
soldiers to whom it corresponds are. If it can understand them it is not devoid of sense.
This is not to say that parts B and C left to their own devices can think in such a 
way as to arrive at true opinions, on Plato's view, far less preserve any true opinion they 
may be given. They correspond, after all, to politicians for whose opinions he had only 
contempt, as one will recall from 425E-426E. He had a similar contempt for the indigenous 
opinions of parts B and G, especially C.
But this raises a difficult question for Plato's conception of psychic justice. If 
parts B and C dimly discern means to ends, and have distinct opinions of their own, how 
is it possible for part A to dislodge their seditious opinions and achieve psychic harmony 
and justice? How can it rule over rivals which are neither weak nor stupid?
On the face of it one might think it impossible for part A to rule over B and C. He 
pointedly calls C "the mass of the psyche" (442A6 ), and likens it to an immense, many­
headed hydra caged with a small lion and a tiny human being (588Bff.). He tells us that 
it is the task of this tiny human being to tame and rule the other two beasts with which 
it is caged. But having depicted them as powerful beasts he makes one wonder how on his 
view one might tame and rule them. Indeed, he makes one wonder whether justice in the 
psyche, so conceived, is possible at all. If one thinks justice in the polis is neverthe­
less possible, one must then ask whether justice in the polis and justice in the psyche can 
be the same, as Plato claimed, especially if justice in the polis must have its source in 
psychic justice. Questions about how psychic justice can be achieved thus return to plague 
Platons claim that justice in the polis is justice in the psyche writ large.
Plato's tale of the beasts was confessedly a simile, however, not a piece of psycho­
logical theorizing. On his actual theory, these parts are not beasts which the best part 
must master but more nearly bullies —  large, selfish and overbearing people. Since they 
correspond not to beasts but to people, they are being likened to persuadable agents. These
- 8-
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parts hold opinions, and one opinion can be exchanged for another in the process of persua­
sion. We know that Plato’s goal was unanimity between the parts (442D2) . But does Plato 
go so far in his isomorphism of polis and psyche that he posits an internal, psychic coun­
terpart to the process of persuasion?
He does. In the Republic itself Plato's model of a person's internal thought-processes 
is unabashedly discursive. At 574D-E he speaks of a conflict in the tyrant's psyg^e between 
opinions accounted just and opinions normally restricted to expression in dreams. Between 
the discrete opinion-holding agents in the psyche there can be bad communications, and one 
part may well cry out in protest at another (550B, 439E) . In the psyche which overcomes 
such problems one part tells soothing stories to another, calming, pacifying and 'charming' 
it (441E-442A, 607B1-608B3).
The view that thought is internal discourse is made still more explicit in the 
Theaetetus and Sophist. At Theaetetus 189E Plato characterizes a person's Xoyos or 
account as the decisive utterance resulting from a conversation of the psyche with itself, 
a conversation complete with questions, answers, affirmations and denials. Given that this 
is precisely what one would expect on the theory of the psyche as composed of agent-like 
parts, and given that Plato continues to hold that theory as late as Sophist (227Eff.), 
Timaeus (69B-72D) and Laws (626D-627B, 689D) , it is plain that on his view this internal 
conversation takes place between distinct parts of the psyche. Again, at Sophist 263E he 
suggests that the thought of a person and the account given by the person are the same, 
with only one important difference: thought is the silent internal dialogue of the psyche
with itself, while an account is "the stream that flows from the psyche through the 
mouth".
If such internal conversations as Plato posits can contain questions, answers, affir­
mations and denials, it seems a small matter to add that some answers and affirmations 
might be persuasive, and others not. Again this was anticipated in thé Republic : Plato
spoke of the gentleness and persuasiveness of the wisdom-loving part, and of the brutality 
and force to which the other parts tend (589B-D) . The wisdom-loving part A is to study 
unity or harmony with an eye to what will help it achieve first of all one crucial sort of 
harmony -- harmony of belief between it and other parts of the psyche. At 442D2-3 Plato 
claims that all parts must believe together that the wisdom-loving part must rule. And the 
person in whom it does rule will bend all his or her efforts to studies which will help 
engender a condition of moderation, justice and wisdom (591B). What sorts of studies might 
these be? And how are they related to justice in the polis?
The answer is illuminated by a more informative and explicit passage matching 591B at 
Phaedrus 229E-230A. There Socrates is made to remark that he has no time at all for investi­
gating the truth about Boreas, the Centaurs, the Chimera, or the like:
For me there is no leisure at all for these things. The reason for this is that I 
am not yet able to understand myself in accordance with the Delphic inscription: so 
it appears to me ludicrous to investigate alien things when I do not understand that. 
Whence I am pleased to let these things go, and being persuaded by the customary view 
about them, ..., I investigate myself rather than these things —  whether I happen to 
be a more complex beast than Typhon, or whether I am a more domesticated and g^mpler 
animal who shares by nature in a certain divine portion and is not puffed up.
This passage suggests not merely the priorities of the wisdom-loving part at its best, 
but the principal source from which this part can gain additional influence over the other 
parts, as we shall see. This key study is self-study or literally psychology, the study
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of the psyche. Even dialectical conversation on Socrates* view might be viewed as a form 
of self-study, for at 255D he suggests that others with whom we converse are like mirrors 
in which we can see ourselves reflected. Attention one might expend upon the study of 
mythology or even the trees and country places is better spent upon self-study, the exami­
nation of the psyche's complexities, Socrates suggests. Why?
The business of the wisdom-loving part is to guide the other parts by persuasion, to 
transplant into alien parts its own opinions, or, more accurately, opinions corresponding 
in content to its knowledge. It is not likely to succeed in doing this unless it recog­
nizes the number and nature of those alien parts. Thus at 270Cff. Plato calls for a full 
study of these on the model of Hippocratic studies in medicine. The focus of such studies 
will be the things each part does or endures, and what affects each in what ways. Above 
all, such studies will focus on the effects of different sorts of discourses on different 
parts of the psyche.
The function of discourse, Plato suggests at 271B, is to lead the psyche by persuasion. 
Presumably this is the function of those speeches of one part to another required by the 
sober dialectical passages in Republic, Theaetetus and Sophist mentioned above, and by the 
myth of the charioteer and his horses in the Phaedrus itself (254C-D). As 271A suggests, 
the wisdom-loving part is to learn towards what each of the other parts is inclined. And 
it must understand that different parts, like different people, are moved by quite differ­
ent sorts of appeals. The wisdom-loving part, like the wisdom-loving person ruled by this 
very part, must learn what each part loves and mu^g construct discourses which are effective 
owing to their promising each part what it loves. The prerequisites for self-mastery and 
the prerequisites for political mastery are precisely the same on Plato's view—  an ade­
quate, psychologically sophisticated rhetoric.
The political importance of this has long been recognized by commentators on the 
Phaedrus, but its psychological and moral importance have not, with the result that it 
has often struck readers as quite uncertain why Plato would write a single dialogue dealing 
in succession^Yith the seemingly miscellaneous and disparate topics of love, the psyche 
and rhetoric. But under the interpretation I am suggesting, the Phaedrus' sequence of 
topics makes excellent sense. It makes more explicit the Republic's notion that a person's 
constituent psychic parts may each be understood in terms of what it loves, and that each 
of these parts may be influenced by discourses offering it hope of attaining what it loves.
The Phaedrus provides evidence that in his discussion of rhetoric Plato is talking 
not simply about how to persuade plebeians. He suggests that persuading plebeians begins 
at home, within one's own psyche. He evidently saw intra-personal communication as more 
important than inter-personal communication, and as the basis for it, in fact, much as 
justice in the psyche was the basis for overt justice at Republic 443Cff. At 267A, for 
example, he claimed that the account, discourse or speech 'written* in the psyche itself 
is the most important of all, not the discourse the rhetorician writes out for others to 
read. At 278A7-B1 he noted that the most legitimate offspring of the genuine rhetorician 
will be the account or discourse 'written* in his own psyche. This is not a recommendation 
that the rhetorician memorize his speeches. He is recommending that the best part of the 
psyche lead the other parts by discourse, that it lead them to unity or harmony in belief and 
action. To implant an account in one's own psyche is for one part of the psyche to implant 
it not in itself, which is scarcely necessary, but in alien parts. The part which does the 
implanting is part A. Only when this implanting has been done is the possessor of this 
wisdom-loving part qualified to lead others by his craft. Like the true physician at 
Gorgias 514Dff., the true rhetorician must cure himself first. The cure consists in ridding 
oneself of internal dissent and faction, achieving the unanimity of belief held up as a goal 
at Republic 442D.
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But this goal for the psyche is likened to health in the body at Pháedrus 270B7, 
thus reinforcing the impression made by Gorgias 479B9, 486D, Républic 444D-E, 476E2,
571Dff., 584E6, and 603B1. And Plato holds that this goal is attainable by verbal means —  
by the use^of words so rem^çkable in their effect that he terms them or "charms" and likens 
them to JHcLpjAdLHKk o r drugs. Yvon Bres and Anthony Kenny have recognized and doc^çented 
Plato's pioneering role in developing beyond metaphor a concept of mental health. But 
Plato played a comparable role in developing i^not devising a concept of psychotherapy by 
verbal means, as Lain-Entralgo has recognized. Plato's Socrates (perhaps with mock- 
modesty) concedes a debt to the Thracian physicians of Zalmoxis' school. At Charmides 
157A he remarks that he learned from these physicians that
...the treatment of the soul ... is by means of certain charms, and these charms 
are words of the right sort: by the use of such words is temperance engendered
in our souls, and as soon as it is engendered and^resent we may easily secure 
health to the head and the rest of the body also.
Whether the concession of a debt here is serious or ironic, there is abundant evidence 
that Plato carries the notion of the treatment of the psyche very far, integrating it 
with his theory of the parts. This theory as he develops it is capable of accounting for 
the power of such Zalmoxian words or "charms".
Plato's theory of the power of woçgs is modelled upon Greek theories of nutrition, 
according to which like feeds on like. Previously we have seen that on Plato's view a 
Xo-y$s or account proceeds from a particular part of the psyche. But it also proceeds in 
a sense to a particular part, which it then nourishes or feeds. At Republic 590E5-591A2 
Plato notes that our aim in controlling children.is to foster or treat the best part in 
them by means of the best part in ourselves, establishing a similar guardian in them, and 
only then leaving them free. His term has both nutritive and therapeutic
connotations, as one would expec^when it was used by one who evidently followed Hippocratic 
medical developments so closely.
This nutritive and dietetic view of the treatment of the psyche is expressed in Plato's 
criticisms of actual poets, dramatists, sophists and rhetoricians in thé Republic. At 
605B-C Plato criticizes the mimetic poet for pleasing an unreasonable part of the psyche.
To please such a part, he suggests, is to feed it a hearty meal and thus to increase its 
strength and vitality relative to the other parts (606A-E, 585B4, 585D5-7, 589B7). Poetry 
and music which please the possession-loving part C he found psychologically, morally and 
politically unhealthy, and he complains of them accordingly at 411A-412A, 404D-E, and 607A.
Plato's ground for recommending that traditional poetry and music be censored is not 
ascetic, if by "ascetic" one means to suggest an antipathy to any satisfaction of the 
possession-loving and honor-loving parts, for at 571E he does advise that these be neither 
starved nor overfed, and at 586E6-587A1 he notes that under the rule of the wisdom-loving 
part these parts will enjoy their own appropriate pleasures. The proposal that the poets 
be censored proceeds from Plato's view that they fail to understand that the possession- 
loving part is already quite large and overbearing, the mass of the psyche in each of us 
(442A; Cp. Laws 689A-B). In their ignorance these poets stuff what needs a reducing diet. 
They overfeed it by describing in attractive terms their character's excessive sensual 
gratification. And since these poets find it difficult to imitate a moderate and stable 
model of which they are largely ignorant in any case, they starve the very part which on 
his view needs feeding (605E-606A).
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Yet it is possible and on Plato's view desirable to contrive poetry, music and rhetoric 
which quiet and soothe the possession-loving and honor-loving parts and thus render them 
more easily satisfied and more nearly in tune with the wisdom-loving part (606B-607A).
Indeed, it seems likely thatjgthe function of his own myths is to do just that to his readers, 
<as Gorgias 493B-D suggests. Note that they often deal with honors, victories and ambro­
sial satisfactions, albeit in an after-life. These are the very things which on his own 
view the wisdom-loving part of the psyche is least interested in. Such stories are co§oU 
addressed then not to the part which cares for truth and genuineness but to parts concerned 
with reputation, honor, and sensual gratification.
It may be a bit disconcerting to read Plato with the suspicion that he sometimes tried 
to appeal not merely to what he viewed as our wiser parts but to what he viewed as our unwise 
and gullible ones as well. It is perhaps slightly unsettling to think that he may be trying 
not merely to inform but to reform the reader. But on reflection, it would have been inap­
propriate for him to have done less than this if he held the views attributed
to him in this study. To his credit, he usually employs appeals to honor and sensual appe­
tite only after he has already tried to make his case in the straightforward dialectical 
way appropriate for an appeal to the wisdom-loving part. This is the case at Phaédo 114D, 
where he sums up the import of the beliefs he has been recounting since 108E, having already 
offered such arguments as he can to the same effect, though without such covert appeals to 
appetite as one sees at 113Eff. Similarly in the Myth of Er at Republic 619B-620E, the 
appeal is clearly to the possession-loving and honor-loving parts, which not only feel cer­
tain pleasures of indulgence but associated pains of deprivation and the threat of it; the 
threat posed to them here is evident.
At Gorgias 523Aff., the same sort of threat to the honor-loving and possession-loving 
parts may be recognized in the talk of a judgment after death, dungeons, stripes and the 
like inflicted upon a naked psyche, talk admittedly offered to reinforce the more reasonable 
appeals made earlier. Compare, for example, 527B-E with 497D, where Socrates had argued 
that good things are not the same as pleasant ones, nor bad things the same as unpleasant 
qnes; yet 527B-E dwells upon the pains, tortures, retributions and the like allegedly await­
ing the evil person after death. Socrates' concern, as he reminds us at 500C, is with that 
way of life which is best, and on his view such a way of life depends upon law and order 
in the psyche (504D), which requires the restraining of passions (505B), a process of 
restraint which, I submit, he himself embarks upon in this myth. As he had noted at 503D.-E, 
in a passage which I take to apply to his own writing as he saw it, Plato remarks,
...the good man, who is intent upon the best when he speaks, will surely not speak 
at random in whatever he says, but with a view to some object. He is just like 
any other craftsman who, having his own particular work in view, selects the things ' 
he applies to that work of his, not at random^but with the purpose of giving a 
certain form to whatever he is working upon".
The form which is of most interest to Plato in such contexts is (Republic
445C6), which is health, good condition, or good order in the psyche (Republic 444D10-E1, 
Gorgias 504D-E). That good order is an arrangement of parts, as we have seen. Merely to 
make a straightforward dialectical case with no supplementary use of myths and charming 
stories would on Plato's view be to appeal solely to less than a third of one's hearer or 
reader —  to a beleaguered fraction in love with wisdom already and in need of reinforce­
ments in its attempt to unify or harmonize the psyche (Republic 527D-E). Stories which 
soothe and quiet parts B and C also increase the relative strength of part A, the wisdom- 
loving one.
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In a good state such reinforcements would come from without in the form of carefully 
chosen myths, music and poetry. In the poor states in which people actually live one may 
have to provide these for oneself. Indeed, Plato’s positing an internal use of rhetoric 
and of "charms” in the Phaedrus as at Republic 608A provides a theoretic framework for this 
self-persuasive enterprise. And he had already described Socrates as engaged in what looks 
very like such an enterprise. One of the more striking passages occurs near the end of the 
Phaedo, where Socrates recounts an elaborate myth about an after-life and much else. Upon 
completing it he remarks, at 114D-E,
Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just 
as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our 
souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may 
properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth-while; and 
he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were maggg charms, which is 
the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long.
Note that Socrates recommends telling oneself such stories for the reassuring and calming 
effect they may have, and that immediately upon concluding this remark he calmly begins 
his final preparations to drink the hemlock and die. He has told a lengthy tale which he 
will not confidently claim is true, and has done so for the effect it has upon himself.
The tale has been told, then, as an éTra;br¡, a "charm" answering both to Socrates' expressed 
eagerness to make himself believe that the psyche is immortal at 91A9-B1 and to the corres­
ponding eagerness of Cebes and Simraias at 77E. Significantly, his friends here do not wish 
to be regarded as themselves afraid of death, but as having perhaps a child within them who 
has such a fear. They regard Socrates as expert in charming away such fears, and suspect 
no one else can do it, but he tells them that they must themselves sing charms ,
E8-9 ) to this child daily until they charm away the fear. This anticipates Republic 608A. 
Laws 665C carries this line of thought even further, making this self-treatment into a 
civic duty.
If Socrates addresses tales to his own psyche, and advises Cebes and Simmias to do 
likewise, then he locates both the physician and the patient in the same psyche. On the 
interpretation of the Republic1 s theory developed here this is explicable. Much as the 
best part of one person's psyche can treat the best part in another's psyche (590E5ff.) , 
so the best part of a person's psyche can treat lesser, childish parts with which it 
cohabits, if it has studied these parts and does not relax its guard (606A9) . Such a per­
son can "provide a \o y o s for himself and others" (534B5) .
The person who has done this successfully on Plato's view turns up under a variety of 
labels. This is the dialectician, the psychically healthy person, the true statesman who 
knows what ig^best for the polis and how to get it, the psychologist, and the genuine 
rhetorician. But this is also the virtuous or excellent person: to be ruled or led by
a persuasively resourceful part which loves wisdom and harmonizes the other parts is to 
have no compelling motive for any conduct which is not virtuous or excellent.
It has been argued above that the parts of the psyche as Plato describes them overlap 
in a number of their capacities at a minimal level, and that thé very conceivability of 
one part's usurping the role of another turns on this. This is not to say that the parts 
overlap in all of their capacities even at a minimal level. Much as there aré people who 
appear utterly devoid of certain capacities, thus making it appropriate to deny that they 
have them at all, so the parts are conceived of as having or lacking certain capacities. 
Part A, for example, is characterized as gentle, not forceful or violent, and it is plainly
beyond its capacity overpower the other parts by brute strength/ as part B might overpower 
the others in anger or part C in hunger, thirst or sexual desire. If it utterly lacks 
sheer brute force, however, it is compensated for this by possessing a potential for deep 
psychological understanding of the other parts and a persuasive power predicated upon that 
understanding which parts B and C utterly lack. The rule of part B is reflected in the 
behavior of people whose psyches it rules. They do not persuade; they rely rather on 
harshness (549A1) and force in ruling (548B7). Those whose psyches are ruled by part C do 
not keep down evil desires by persuading themselves that they had better not indulge them, 
but keep them down, if at all, only out of fear for the loss of their possessions (554D2-3).
IV
That the parts of the psyche are so conceived that they overlap in certain capacities 
but not others only serves to make them all the more like the people to whom they correspond. 
This brings us, finally, to an almost-inevitable reservation one must at least entertain 
about Plato's theory as interpreted here. In fact, if this reservation is thought seriously 
unflattering to Plato, and Plato is thought deserving of flattery, one may J^ink reser~ 
vation damaging to the interpretation itself rather than to Plato's theory.
The reservation has to do with likening anything whatever to a human being. It would 
be easy to caricature the theory as portrayed here as if it involved Plato in positing a 
committee of homonculi animating each person. Indeed, it is evident that a number of inter­
preters have been deterred from offering the sort of interpretation developed here, despite 
the te^jjuai evidence for it, owing to the seeming absurdity of the view it attributes to 
Plato. One can understand the reluctance to recognize in Plato's theory so sweeping an 
anthropomorphism. People are scarcely our current paradigms of constancy or intelligibility. 
The theory may appear to have gone so far in its anthropomorphism that it incorporates at 
a new level the very sorts of problems it was designed to illuminate. If we are curious, 
as Plato evidently was, why a tyrant lacks self-control, it will scarcely impress us to be 
told that this is owing to his being ruled within by a mini-tyrant who lacks self control 
(575C5-D2). This internal agent may seem all-too-like the one whose foibles motivated the 
theory in the first place. The explanatory power of a theory positing such an agent within 
may seem to rank about as low as that of Anaxagoras' alleged view that everything is what 
it contains the mosg^of, and that what it contains the most of is readily apparent in its 
sensible qualities.
This sort of problem has been rggognized in the literature before, but has not to my 
knowledge had an adequate treatment. The dangers it poses are not confined to a seeming 
dearth of explanatory power. On the pattern of explanation Plato employs, namely the pat­
tern of explaining the action of a whole as the overt action of a part within a whole, one 
may wonder why, if at all, one cannot then ask about the action of th|£ part, treating it 
in turn as a whole, and so embarking upon a vicious infinite regress. The more closely 
Plato assimilates parts of the psyche to people, the more he appears to invite this regress. 
Such a regress of parts-within-parts could make nonsense of Plato's theory as interpreted 
in this study.
The regress problem is the easier of the two to deal with, for it can be solved on 
textual grounds alone, without appealing to extra-Platonic notions such as that of explana­
tory power.
A regress of parts-within-parts could make nonsense of Plato's 
here only if Plato were so engrossed in making the parts correspond 
the parts subject to the same sorts of problems which motivated him 
These, it will be recalled, were problems of internal conflict, and
theory as interpreted 
to people that he made 
to posit parts initially, 
the incoherence which
seems to result from not recognizing it. But did he describe any part of the psyche as 
being beset by the sorts of conflict suffered by a person such as Leontius?
It is important to recognize here that not just any internal conflict in a part will 
be sufficient to get an infinite (and hence vicious) regress going. An infinite regress 
would require that the conflicts be between sub-parts isomorphic to the tripartite person, 
sub-parts which love wisdom for its own sake, honor for its own sake, and sensual gratifi­
cation for its own sake, all of these sub-parts within the honor-loving part itself, for 
example. But there is not the slightest evidence that Plato regarded any of the parts of 
the psyche as isomorphic in structure to the entire tripartite psyche. There is evidence 
that he recognized conflicts within part C, and hence that he was committed to regarding 
at least that part as having sub-parts. But these conflicts are between sub-parts given 
to different sorts of sensual appetites, not ÿ^e familiar conflicts between a sensual part, 
an honor-loving one, and a wisdom-loving one.
^  It is still more important however to recall that Plato terms the parts of the psyche 
eci>r¡, a term usually rendered "forms" elsewhere. The paradeigmatic forms are not animate, 
as the parts of the psyche are, and^y not translating e lê & s as "form" in its psychologies 
use we prevent a certain confusion. But we may also overlook an affinity Plato wished 
to acknowledge. One of the crucial characteristics of a paradeigmatic form such as equalit; 
was its purity; it was to contain no tincture of anything incompatible with it (Phaedo 
74B-C) . The ψίλ}(η5 are "pure" in a related way, despite their being essentially
active. They are, each of them, pure and constant in their priorities. And in this crucia 
respect they differ from the people to whom they correspond by as vast a margin as heat doe; 
from a fire.
^At 581B1, for example, the honor-loving part B is said to be wholly set upon (oXoV 
t) ruling, winning and good reputation. There is, as argued earlier, a means-end 
relationship even among these three things which part B is set upon, but Plato's point here 
appears to be that anything other than these three is never valued by this part save as a 
means to one or more of these. The lover of something loves all of it (475B5) , cannot get 
enough of it (475C9), and welcomes it on any pretext (475A7). Plainly no person, no matter
how fanatical or crazed, is likely to measure ujd to the Platonic description "lover of ___"
A lover of ____ is a stereotype, a paradigm, an e l^ o s which a person can only approximate. ' 1
part of the psyche on this view is such an.¿í§o5 t a stereotypically constant lover of one 
sort of thing for its own sake, and of others merely as means to this if at all.
No person containing several such stereotypical set quite insatiably on disparate
goals could easily measure up to any one of them fully. People, living in the realm of 
becoming (525B5) , cannot easily rise out of it and ignore what any part demands. Unlike 
their psychic parts, people contain independent and inherently fractious parts. The parts 
of the psyche Plato posits then cannot mirror the exact sorts of factions and confusions 
about priorities to which people are prone. His isomorphism of polis and psyche cannot 
generate a vicious infinite regress, for the political agents in the psyche are fjgm the 
beginning elevated into form-like stereotypes unwavering in their disparate aims.
There remains the question about the explanatory power of the theory. The question 
runs well beyond the scope of this study and indeed the scope of Platonic scholarship itselJ 
One must defer here to philosophers of science competent enough or audacious enough to haz­
ard a measure of explanatory power. One may well defer also to philosophers interested in 




It is perhaps appropriate to remind ourselves finally that the term "Platonist" has 
two distinct senses: "One who studies and explicates the views of Plato", and "One who
adheres to and defends the views of Plato". One can scarcely adhere to and defend intelli­
gently what has not been adequately explicated; hence the work of the Platonist in the 
first sense is prior to that of the Platonist in the second. I have attempted in this 
study to do only the first sort of work except where the philosophical defects seem to 
have loomed so large for so long and to so many that it is difficult to entertain the argu­
ment that Plato held views subject to them. To allow questions of the philosophical worth 
or defensibility of Plato's views to have any more extensive effect than this upon a work 
of interpretation is to risk proceeding on the unstated assumption that Plato's views —  
whatever they were —  are known a priori to be philosophically defensible. But ideas of 
philosophical defensibility vary widely from place to place and time to time. Hence to 
assume that Plato's views are known à priori to be philosophically defensible is tantamount 
to making Platonism into a variable content religion, not a definite web of philosophical 
positions. Among those called "Platonists", as among the denizens of thg^pólis Plato 
envisions, a certain specialization and restriction of function is wise.
Jon Moline
The University of Wisconsin-Madison
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